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OPINION
______________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
While responding to a domestic dispute call, Police Officer Reagan
Rafferty shot Appellant Edwin Anthony Ramos-Ramirez. Following the incident,
Ramos-Ramirez pled guilty to simple assault with a deadly weapon. RamosRamirez then filed the present lawsuit alleging that he was subjected to
constitutionally excessive force. The District Court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants, holding that Appellant’s excessive force claim was barred
by his guilty plea to simple assault under Heck v. Humphrey.1 We conclude that
the District Court erred in its application of Heck. Therefore, we will vacate the
District Court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.



This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.
1
512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
2

I.
This case arose out of an August 15, 2015 domestic dispute in Berwick
Borough, at the home of Appellant’s girlfriend, Brittany Cope. After an argument
between Appellant and Cope, Appellant locked Cope out of the home. In
response, Cope called her ex-boyfriend, Alfredo Melendez, to come over and
“kick [Appellant] out of [her] house.”2 Appellant asserts that when Melendez
arrived he tried to enter the house through a window and, although Melendez did
not succeed in entering the house, he managed to hit Appellant through the
window with a large stick. Appellant then grabbed a knife from the kitchen and,
according to Cope, tried to stab Melendez with the knife through the open
window. Over the course of this encounter, both Cope and Appellant called 911.
At around 11p.m., Officer Rafferty, Chief Kenneth Strish and Officer
Randy Gauger responded to two calls requesting assistance at Cope’s address: one
regarding a suspicious person and the other related to a domestic dispute involving
a man armed with a knife. Officer Rafferty was the first to arrive on the scene.
He testified that upon arrival, he saw Melendez on the porch of the residence
holding a stick. After Officer Rafferty exited his car, he saw Appellant come out
onto the porch of the house, holding a knife. Rafferty remained on the sidewalk
separated from Appellant and Melendez by a small retaining wall. At this point,
the testimony diverges.
2

Appx126-27.
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Appellant claims that he walked onto the porch, heard someone yelling to
drop the knife, and was almost immediately shot.3 He claims that he was shot
while standing on the porch, and that he was not making any threatening or
aggressive movements or gestures toward Melendez. Appellant further testified
that Melendez backed away across the yard when Appellant emerged from the
house and was approximately 20 feet away from Appellant at the time Officer
Rafferty fired his weapon.
Certain aspects of Appellant’s testimony were corroborated in a deposition
by Cope. Her deposition testimony, however, conflicts with the signed statement
that she provided to police on the night of the incident. In her deposition, Cope
states that Appellant was not chasing Melendez but “just came off of the porch”
when the “cops shot him.”4 However, in the statement provided to the police
officers on the night of the incident, Cope said “Anthony opened the door and ran
after [A]lfredo with the knife. As Anthony was running the police office[r] said
twice to put the knife down [a]nd he did not. The police . . . shot once at Anthony
in his shoulder.”5 When asked about the inconsistency between her statement to
police and her deposition testimony, Cope said “I assumed that [Ramos-Ramirez]
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Appellant states that the police did not identify themselves upon arrival to the
scene and that he did not know that police were present. Cope corroborates this
testimony saying “nobody knew it was the police when they came until after he
shot him.” Appx138. Officer Rafferty also testified that he turned off his lights
and sirens about a block before arriving.
4
Appx139.
5
SAppx62-63.
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was going towards [Melendez] but I don’t know where he was going because the
cop shot him as soon as he came off the porch.”6
In contrast to Appellant and Cope’s testimony, police officers on the scene
and Melendez all state that Appellant was actively chasing Melendez with a knife
at the time he was shot. In his interview with police officers after the incident,
Melendez stated that he heard the police yell “drop it, drop the knife, drop the
weapons” and that Appellant was within four feet of Melendez when he was shot.7
Similarly, Officer Rafferty testified that he observed the Appellant exit the house
with a knife and Melendez with a wooden stick. He stated that he ordered both
men to drop their weapons. Melendez complied but Appellant did not drop his
knife. Officer Rafferty stated that he witnessed Appellant chasing Melendez with
the knife. Officer Rafferty then claims that he fired his weapon when Appellant
was within a few feet of Melendez. He asserts that he believed Appellant was
going to stab Melendez. Additionally, Chief Strish testified that as he was pulling
up and putting his car in park, he witnessed Appellant chasing Melendez with the
knife raised above his head.
On January 10, 2017, Appellant pled guilty to simple assault with a deadly
weapon. During the plea colloquy in state court, the court stated “[t]he elements
of this kind of simple assault is that you attempted to cause bodily injury to
another person, and in this particular case with a deadly weapon, specifically a
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Appx139-40.
SAppx20-21.
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knife.”8 Next, the facts of the case were read: “It is alleged that on or about the
15th day of August, 2015, in the Borough of Berwick, the Defendant did attempt to
cause bodily injury to the victim Alfredo Melendez using a deadly weapon,
namely a knife, by chasing him with said knife.”9 Then, the court asked Appellant
if those facts are true, to which he replied “Yes, your honor.”10 Based on these
facts, the court accepted Appellant’s guilty plea.
At sentencing, the facts of Appellant’s plea were reiterated and Appellant’s
defense counsel stated, “Mr. Ramos understands that he had a knife and it appears
like he was going into[sic] Mr. Melendez’s direction.”11
To commence the present action, Appellant filed a Complaint alleging
Monell claims against Appellees Berwick Borough and Chief Strish, an excessive
force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Rafferty, a civil rights
conspiracy claim against all Appellees, and supplemental state claims for various
state torts against Officer Rafferty.12 Ultimately, the District Court granted
Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that Appellant’s § 1983
excessive force claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey.13
This appeal followed.
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Appx444.
Id.
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Id.
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SAppx68.
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Appx017.
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512 U.S. 477 (1994).
9
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II.14
Appellant argues that the District Court erred in concluding that his
excessive force claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey.15 In Heck, the Supreme
Court held that that a plaintiff may not recover damages under § 1983 if doing so
would imply the invalidity of a prior conviction, unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.16 For
Heck to apply “it must be the case that a successful § 1983 suit and the underlying
conviction be logically contradictory.”17 Other courts of appeals have generally
held that the mere fact of a conviction for assault or similar conduct does not
automatically preclude recovery on an excessive force claim brought
under § 1983, arising out of the same incident.18
Similarly, in Nelson v. Jashurek, this Court determined that convictions for
resisting arrest do not necessarily invalidate § 1983 excessive force claims stating,
“it is possible for a finding that [the defendant] was resisting arrest to coexist with

14

The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1343. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The
Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995).
15
512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
16
Id. at 487.
17
Dyer v. Lee, 488 F.3d 876, 884 (11th Cir. 2007).
18
See, e.g., Dyer, 488 F.3d at 883; McCann v. Neilsen, 466 F.3d 619, 620 (7th Cir.
2006); Thore v. Howe, 466 F.3d 173, 180 (1st Cir. 2006); Ballard v. Burton, 444
F.3d 391, 400-01 (5th Cir. 2006); Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir.
1996) (per curiam).
7

a finding that the police used excessive force to subdue him.19 In keeping with
Nelson, we conclude that simple assault with a deadly weapon under Pennsylvania
law is not necessarily inconsistent with an excessive force claim. It is possible that
an individual could attempt to cause bodily injury to a third party and that a police
officer could use excessive force in their attempt to intervene.20
However, even where a particular type of conviction is not necessarily
inconsistent with a § 1983 suit, courts look to the underlying facts pled to assess
whether a claim is barred by Heck.21 The First Circuit discussed this factual
approach in O’Brien v. Town of Bellingham, stating “[a] plaintiff’s excessive force
claim and his conviction ‘may be so interrelated factually as to bar the § 1983
claim.’”22 In such circumstances, “to determine Heck’s applicability, a court must
. . . [ask] whether the plaintiff could prevail only by ‘negat[ing] an element of the
offense of which he [was] convicted.’”23

19

109 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted) (holding that a
reasonable juror could find that the arrestee resisted arrest, but was still subjected
to excessive force).
20
Under Pennsylvania law, simple assault occurs where an individual “attempts to
cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.”
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1). In contrast, excessive force occurs where an officer
uses unreasonable or excessive force to bring an arrestee into custody. Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
21
McCann, 466 F.3d at 621-22.
22
943 F.3d 514, 529 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing Thore v. Howe, 466 F.3d 173, 180 (1st
Cir. 2006)).
23
Id. (last two alterations in original) (quoting Thore, 466 F.3d at 180).
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Appellant pled guilty to simple assault asserting that he attempted to cause
bodily injury to Melendez “by chasing him with [a] knife.”24 Now, in pursuit of a
civil judgment against Officer Rafferty, Appellant makes two arguments. First,
Appellant argues that Officer Rafferty used excessive force because Appellant was
not chasing Melendez. Second, Appellant argues that even if he was chasing
Melendez, Officer Rafferty’s force was excessive because Appellant was too far
away from Melendez to stab him and, thus, was not an immediate threat. Although
Appellant’s first argument would negate an element of his simple assault
conviction and is barred by Heck, Appellant’s second argument does not imply the
invalidity of his conviction. Therefore, to the extent that Appellant argues that he
was simply too far away from Melendez to pose an immediate threat, Appellant’s
excessive force claim is not barred by Heck.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment to
the extent that it granted Appellees summary judgment under Heck v. Humphrey
and will remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
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Appx444.
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